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The Staggers Act of 1980 deregulated
many of the activities of the nation's
railroads. A primary reason for deregula
tion was the belief that technological
change had created trucking and barge
industries which provide close market
competition for the railroads. Conse
quently, shippers could be protected from
monopolistic railroad exploitation by the
natural • operation of competitive market
forces. Such protection would be more
effective and efficient than protection
provided by government regulation of rail
roads .
Individually Negotiated Rail Contracts
One of the provisions of the Staggers
Act allowed railroads to contract with
individual shippers to provide transporta
tion. Prior to 1980, rates and conditions
under which a railroad would provide ser
vice had to be made public through pub
lished tariffs; the Scime rates and condi
tions applied to all shippers. Since
1980, shippers and receivers of grain have
been allowed to contract with railroads
individually, creating terms applicable
only to that shipper/receiver. In addi
tion to rates, terms of such contracts
often include conditions on commodities,
minimum volumes, origins, destinations,
responsibility for car supply, and length
of contract.
By the end of 1986, nearly 48,000
such contracts had been negotiated and
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commis
sion. More than 8,000 of those contracts
(17%) covered the movement of grain by
rail. Since such contracts are confiden
tial agreements between private parties,
it is not possible to completely assess
their terms or impact. Various indivi
duals and organizations have, however,
cited what they believe to be some of the
effects of rail contracting. Contracts
provide a certainty of rates and volumes
which allow better planning and more effi
cient utilization of railroad equipment
and shipper/receiver grain handling faci
lities and equipment. These efficiency
gains are often credited with lowering
rail rates for the movement of grain and
increasing investment in grain handling
capacity.
Impacts of Individually Negotiated Rail
Contracts
Grain rates have decreased since
rail contracts have become legal. Invest
ments in grain handling capacity have been
made, with an increased share of grain
traffic moving in unit trains. Two broad
questions, however, have been raised.
First, are the lower rates and greater
investment due to contracting or would
they have occurred anyway in a market with
excess transportation capacity and large
volumes of lower priced grain? If the
reduced rates and greater grain handling
capacity are at least partly due to rail
contracts, the second question is: how
are the benefits of such cost reductions
distributed? Depending upon the condi
tions in several market sectors, such
benefits could be passed on to consumers;
retained by railroads, grain receivers by
rail, or grain shippers by rail; or,
passed back to grain producers.
To leam the extent to which South
Dakota grain shippers use rail contracts
and how those shippers view the impacts of
contracts,. a survey was undertaken in
December 1986. All 177 elevators with
rail service were surveyed. Of these, 92
(52%) responded. Only 32% of the respon
dents had never shipped grain under terms
of a rail contract, 36% had shipped under
their own contract, while 68% had shipped
under their own contract or that of
another shipper or receiver.
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About 61% of the elevators shipping
under individually negotiated rail con
tracts indicated a belief that the con
tracts had increased their volume, 26%
thought contracts had had no impact on
their volume, and only 11% thought con
tracting had reduced their volume. Of
those which had never used contracts, only
3% thought contracting had increased their
volume, 3A% believed contracts used by
others had decreased their volume, and 38%
did not think contracting had affected
their volume.
With respect to their ability to
compete in the grain market, 67% of the
contract users thought contracts had maAa
them more competitive while only 3% of
those not using contracts thought they
were more competitive. Competitiveness
was thought to be negatively affected by
48% of those not using contracts and only
13% of those using contracts.
.Shippers were also asked whether rail
contracts had affected the prices they
paid to grain producers. Of those using
rail contracts, 85% said they had passed
benefits back to farmers through higher.
prices and 6% thought contracts had
lowered prices paid to farmers.. Of those
shippers which did not use contracts, only
7% thought they had been forced by others'
contracting to pay higher prices while 24%
thought contracting had reduced prices
paid to farmers.
Interpretation of Findings
The responses to this short survey
are consistent with those in several other
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states. Rail contracts tend to be used by
shippers which can take advantage of large
voliunes. Such shippers often ship grain
under contracts negotiated by their cus
tomers, large grain buying firms. This
observation is consistent with the claim
that large firms are capable of negotiat
ing more advantageous contract terms
because they can spread negotiating costs
over a larger volume of purchases and can
offer railroads guaranteed large volume
traffic. It is not clear whether the
existence of a rail contract increases a
shipper's volume as most respondents
reported or if it is only the ability to
ship a large volume which makes a rail
contract feasible.
Since significant economies of scale
exist in the handling of grain, it is also
not clear that contracts have reduced the
cost of shipping grain as respondents
suggest. Lower rail rates made available
during this period may only be a market
response to the scale economies available
to large volume shippers, the excess
covered hopper car capacity, and the
availability of truck and barge transpor
tation at historically low rates.
Whether lower transportation costs
are attributable only to efficiencies due
to large volume, or also to efficiencies
introduced by contracting or recent market
circumstances, it appears that a signifi
cant share of such gains has been passed
back to producers.
